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Consciousness has of late become a “hot topic” in neuroscience. Empirical work has cen-
tered on identifying potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), with a converging
view that the prefrontal parietal network (PPN) is closely associated with this process.The-
oretical work has primarily sought to explain how informational properties of this cortical
network could account for phenomenal properties of consciousness. However, both empir-
ical and theoretical research has given less focus to the psychological features that may
account for the NCCs. The PPN has also been heavily linked with cognitive processes,
such as attention. We describe how this literature is under-appreciated in consciousness
science, in part due to the increasingly entrenched assumption of a strong dissociation
between attention and consciousness. We argue instead that there is more common
ground between attention and consciousness than is usually emphasized: although objects
can under certain circumstances be attended to in the absence of conscious access, atten-
tion as a content selection and boosting mechanism is an important and necessary aspect
of consciousness. Like attention, working memory and executive control involve the inter-
linking of multiple mental objects and have also been closely associated with the PPN.We
propose that this set of cognitive functions, in concert with attention, make up the core
psychological components of consciousness. One related process, chunking, exploits log-
ical or mnemonic redundancies in a dataset so that it can be recoded and a given task
optimized. Chunking has been shown to activate PPN particularly robustly, even compared
with other cognitively demanding tasks, such as working memory or mental arithmetic. It
is therefore possible that chunking, as a tool to detect useful patterns within an integrated
set of intensely processed (attended) information, has a central role to play in conscious-
ness. Following on from this, we suggest that a key evolutionary purpose of consciousness
may be to provide innovative solutions to complex or novel problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Questions concerning the nature of consciousness have profound
and widespread personal, ethical and clinical implications, and a
comprehensive understanding of consciousness is one of the most
important and pressing issues in biology (Seth, 2010). Although
consciousness is difﬁcult to deﬁne (Zeman, 2005),we take the base
concept to be the presence of phenomenal content for an agent,
and we emphasize a distinction between conscious level (i.e., a
position on a scale from total unconsciousness as in coma to vivid
and alert wakefulness) and conscious content (i.e., the components
of any given conscious scene – the qualia; Seth et al., 2008). We
assume that a non-zero conscious level is needed for any conscious
contents to exist.
In recent years, the scientiﬁc study of human conscious-
ness has been transformed from a niche ﬁeld into an increas-
ingly popular, active, and sophisticated topic of research. At the
level of brain mechanisms, consciousness science now synthe-
sizes results from a broad range of techniques, including elec-
trophysiology, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
magneto/electroencephalography (M/EEG), intracranial record-
ings, neuropsychology, and computational models (Tononi and
Koch, 2008). In the next section, we will describe how a coher-
ent pattern has emerged from these studies, in which two tiers
of brain regions seem critical for consciousness: ﬁrst, modality
speciﬁc regions, such as those in extra-striate cortex, underlie the
speciﬁc (phenomenal) contents of consciousness; second, the pre-
frontal parietal network (PPN) in concert with the thalamus is
heavily implicated in consciousness more generally, regardless of
content. The PPN can therefore be viewed as a “core correlate” of
consciousness.
Although some theories of consciousness have been predicated
on the link between consciousness and the PPN, others are more
neutral on this issue. In the section “Theories of Consciousness,”
we will outline the main theories of consciousness and discuss
the extent these theories are consistent with the empirical data
linking consciousness with the PPN. We will also describe the psy-
chological components of these theories, while noting that detail
is currently lacking on this front. Instead, theoretical emphasis is
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given to widespread cortical network activity as a necessary com-
ponent of consciousness, which is commonly discussed in terms
of integrated information.
One approach to add psychological detail to models of con-
sciousness would be to examine what other functions the PPN has
been associatedwith. Fortunately, the PPN is one of themost stud-
ied of brain networks, and – beyond the context of consciousness
science per se – has been closely linkedwith attention, among other
functions (Duncan, 2006; Bor and Owen, 2007). In the section
“The Overlap Between Attention and Consciousness,” we criti-
cally assess the increasingly popular view of the independence of
conscious and attentional processes (van Boxtel et al., 2010b). In
contrast,wewill argue that all conscious events require attention in
some form, and that attention has a critical role to play in selecting
conscious contents.
The PPN is closely associated with a far broader set of cog-
nitive functions than merely attention (Duncan, 2006; Bor and
Owen, 2007). For instance, working memory, executive control,
and chunking have been particularly robustly associated with the
PPN (Bor et al., 2003, 2004; Abe et al., 2007; Bor and Owen, 2007;
Erickson et al., 2007; Koechlin and Summerﬁeld, 2007). In the
section “What is the Functional Role of the Prefrontal Parietal
Network?” we outline how this range of cognitive processes may
furnish models of consciousness with further psychological detail.
We view consciousness as serving to provide innovative solutions
to otherwise intransigent problems: we suggest that consciousness
involves attending to information relevant to a biological goal,
especially when automatic unconscious routines are unable to
carry out that goal. Typically, this will occur for novel or complex
tasks, where multiple features need to be managed simultaneously
or in series, viaworkingmemory.We argue that chunkingmay play
a special role in consciousness, by detecting and encoding regulari-
ties between items inworkingmemory, thus aiding understanding,
so that a given goal is more likely to be reached and automation
accelerated.
EVIDENCE LINKING THE PREFRONTAL PARIETAL NETWORK
WITH CONSCIOUS CONTENT
Although studies have reported PPN activity during subliminal
processing (Diaz and McCarthy, 2007; Luo et al., 2009), the over-
whelming evidence, both from lesion and perturbation studies
and functional imaging studies, suggests that PPN is very closely
associated with consciousness.
LESION AND PERTURBATION STUDIES OF CONSCIOUS CONTENT
Both focal lesion patient studies and transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) experiments in normal volunteers strongly impli-
cate the PPN in supporting conscious contents. For instance,
in one study patients with unilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC)
lesions and healthy controls were brieﬂy shown a number at
one of four locations, followed after a variable delay by a mask
(Del Cul et al., 2009). Subjects stated whether or not they
had seen the number, and then guessed what the number was.
Although objective performance for seen trials was matched
between patients and controls, PFC patients were signiﬁcantly less
likely to consciously detect trials answered correctly, compared to
controls.
Though conscious contents were not abolished in these cases,
more severe consciousness impairments following unilateral PFC
damage may be limited by extensive plasticity in these regions,
such that the undamaged hemisphere can rapidly take over func-
tion (Voytek et al., 2010). Knight and Grabowecky (1995) have
described a rare bilateral PFC lesion patient who was awake,
but was otherwise almost entirely unresponsive to stimuli. With
respect to conscious level rather than content, bilateral diffuse
damage to prefrontal and parietal white matter is associated with
vegetative state or coma (Tshibanda et al., 2009), while restora-
tion of functional connectivity between the thalamus and PFC,
as well as the anterior cingulate, is associated with recovery from
vegetative state (Laureys et al., 2000).
Parietal lesions also lead to impaired conscious processing. For
instance, Simons and colleagues compared bilateral posterior pari-
etal lesion patients and controls on a long-term memory task,
involving the recollection of the context in which stimuli are ﬁrst
encountered. Although recollection performance was matched
between groups, the parietal lesion group exhibited impaired sub-
jective experience of the memories they were retrieving (Simons
et al., 2010).
Complementing the patient data, studies in normal volunteers
using TMS have strongly implicated the PPN in consciousness.
For instance, Turatto and colleagues presented volunteers with
two grids of four faces for 200ms, separated by a 300ms blank
screen. On half the trials, the two sets of faces were non-identical.
When a repetitive train of eight TMS pulses at 10Hz was adminis-
tered to right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) at the onset
of the ﬁrst grid, the participants’ ability to detect the change was
impaired (Turatto et al., 2004).A further study byBeck et al. (2006)
using a very similar paradigm, demonstrated that change detec-
tion is also impaired following TMS to the right posterior parietal
cortex. A more recent study used a novel TMS technique, known
as continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS), which involves a
rapid train of TMS pulses, for approximately 40 s, so that activity
in the stimulated region is suppressed for a sustained period of
time, approximately 30min in length (Huang et al., 2005). Rou-
nis et al. (2010) gave participants a masked low contrast visual
detect task both before and after TMS administration bilaterally to
the DLPFC. Although objective performance was titrated to 75%
accuracy on both occasions, impaired visibility ratings were found
during the block following TMS. Another cTBS study by Kanai
et al. (2010) reported that TMS applied to posterior parietal cortex
increased the perceptual duration prior to a switch in a motion-
induced bistable visual stimulus. Although bilateral results were
found here, Zaretskaya et al. (2010), using a similar paradigm,
found results somewhat limited to the right intraparietal sulcus,
although considerable individual differences were reported.
This tendency in the literature to show preferential right PPN
involvement (Turatto et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Zaretskaya
et al., 2010) echoes ﬁndings from the attentional neurological con-
dition, hemispatial neglect, which in the vast majority of cases
follows right PPN damage (Husain and Kennard, 1996; Husain
and Rorden, 2003). In addition, the parietal region in these TMS
studies is very close to that associated in functional imaging studies
with attentional switching processes (Corbetta et al., 1995; Yantis
et al., 2002). Indeed, both Kanai and Zaretskaya posit that the
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mechanism for delays in perceptual switches as a result of TMS
to posterior parietal cortex is due to a reduction in attentional
resources. In linewith this, a similar reduction in perceptual switch
rate to binocular rivalry stimuli can be induced just by divert-
ing attention away from the bistable stimuli (Paffen et al., 2006;
Alais et al., 2010). Furthermore, by indirectly inferring attention
state from EEG signatures, Zhang et al. (2011) demonstrated that
diverting attention away from a binocular rivalry stimulus abol-
ishes rivalry, suggesting that not only does attention modulate
binocular rivalry rates, but that it is a necessary component of the
phenomenon.
The lesion and perturbation studies described above strongly
implicate all key individual components of the PPN in conscious
processing. However, such methods have a more limited role in
examining the relationship between consciousness and the PPN
as a whole. Functional neuroimaging studies, discussed next, are
well placed to address this question.
FUNCTIONAL IMAGING STUDIES
In one of the ﬁrst studies to examine visual consciousness using
fMRI, only PPN and extra-striate activity were observed when
switches in visual consciousness in a binocular rivalry paradigm
were compared with a perceptually matched condition without
rivalry (Lumer et al., 1998). A follow-up binocular rivalry study
without behavioral responses demonstrated that motor output
cannot be responsible for this pattern of activity: extra-striate
activity reﬂecting changes in perception most closely correlated
with PPN activity, whereas V1 activity failed convincingly to cor-
relate with any other region (Lumer and Rees, 1999). The PPN has
also been associated with consciousness in fMRI studies of other
bistable paradigms, such as ambiguous ﬁgures (Kleinschmidt et al.,
1998), the spinning wheel illusion (Sterzer et al., 2002), and ﬂicker
(Carmel et al., 2006).
It is unclear, however, whether such PPN activity reﬂects the
cause of changes in conscious contents or alternatively the down-
stream effects of these changes. Knapen et al. (2011) have recently
provided evidence that PPN activity, at least in the right hemi-
sphere, is a response to perceptual change in binocular rivalry:
normal participants were presented with a range of binocular
rivalry stimuli, which induced variable transition periods between
the two competing percepts. Longer transitions were associated
with prolonged right PPN activity. Simulated external transitions,
which carefully matched internal transition lengths, were associ-
ated with similar patterns of PPN activity, suggesting that the PPN
was mainly associated with a response to perceptual change. Con-
sistent with this view, fMRI responses correlating with the percept
have been found in early sensory areas in many bistable paradigms
(Lee et al., 2005), and in binocular rivalry even as early as the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus (Haynes et al., 2005). Sil-
lito et al. (2006), however, stress the importance of cortical outputs
to LGN, suggesting either that LGN perceptual-tracking activity
has a cortical source, possibly in V1 or MT, or that even if LGN
activity is the cause of binocular rivalry, that there are clear cortical
pathways which could modulate various features of the binocu-
lar rivalry percept by differential attentional focus. Summarizing
these observations, although the causal factors underlying bistable
perceptual transitions remain unclear, there is little doubt that
PPN activity reﬂects the resulting subjective conscious contents.
Another relevant class of fMRI studies utilize psychophysical
masking paradigms in order to compare visiblewith invisible stim-
uli. For instance,Dehaene et al. (2001) showed that when visibility
of word stimuli was modulated by masking, those stimuli which
were consciously perceived additionally activatedmodality speciﬁc
regions in fusiform gyrus, as well as inferior frontal and parietal
regions. However, a general problem with masking paradigms is
that they may confound conscious contents with objective per-
formance. Addressing this concern, Lau and Passingham (2006)
implemented a metacontrast masking paradigm, which ensured
that objective performance was equated while subjective visibility
could be manipulated. In this more controlled design, only the
DLPFC portion of PPN was reported to covary with visibility.
Electroencephalography studies have also implicated the PPN
in consciousness. Melloni and colleagues compared oscillatory
EEG activity evoked by visible and invisible words in a delayed
matching to sample task. Consistent with theories emphasizing
the importance of functional connectivity in consciousness (see
the next section), they found that both visible and invisible words
caused increases in local gamma-band oscillations, but only visible
words induced increased long-range gamma-band synchroniza-
tion, consistent with PPN involvement. In addition, during the
maintenance period, enhanced theta oscillations were observed
over frontal regions (Melloni et al., 2007). More direct evidence
is provided by a recent study by Hipp et al. (2011) in which EEG
synchrony was assessed between source-localized cortical regions;
the authors identiﬁed two distinct cortical networks predictive of
perception: a beta-band fronto-parieto-occipital network and a
gamma-band centro-temporal network.
Conventional M/EEG studies carry inevitable ambiguities
regarding spatial resolution and localization, and suffer poor
signal-to-noise ratios. Recent studies using intracranial EEG mea-
surements are therefore particularly valuable. In one landmark
study, intracranially implanted presurgical patients were presented
with invisible (masked) or visible (unmasked) words. Sustained
consciousness-related activity for the unmasked words was found
most robustly in PFC (Gaillard et al., 2009).
While all studies described so far have examined visual con-
sciousness, similar results have been reported in other modalities.
For instance, Sadaghiani et al. (2009) used an auditory detection
paradigm at threshold to show that conscious detection reﬂected
prefrontal and inferior parietal activity, though other regions
were also found, including the insula, thalamus, and striatum.
In another intriguing study, Hasson et al. (2007) used a pas-
sive cross-modal paradigm involving the McGurk effect, in which
the auditory perception of a given syllable is determined by the
fusion of two different auditory and visual syllables. Using rep-
etition priming, participants were played an audiovisual target
that was preceded either by a stimulus that matched the target’s
visual features alone, its auditory features alone, or neither, but
which instead matched the subjective percept of the fusion of the
target’s competing auditory and visual syllables. While auditory
cortex regions tracked the objective features of the stimulus, PPN
activity was associated with the conscious percept, as reﬂected in
a reduction in activity limited to the fused prime trials.
The studies described so far have examined the neural corre-
lates of changes in consciousness. Other experiments have shown
that sustaining a percept also implicates the PPN. For instance,
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Erikkson and colleagues presented participants in the fMRI scan-
ner with fragmentary ﬁgures, which unlike bistable viewing par-
adigms, involve only a single perceptual transition, followed by a
period of sustained perception. The PPN was found to be associ-
ated both with transient and sustained aspects of visual perception
on this task (Eriksson et al., 2004).
In addition to functional imaging studies, two recent structural
imaging studies have associated the PPN with consciousness. First,
Kanai et al. (2010) demonstrated that individual differences inpos-
terior parietal cortex cortical thickness, gray matter density, and
white matter integrity correlate with volunteers’ alternation rates
when viewing bistable ﬁgures. Second, Fleming and colleagues
used structural imaging to examine individual differences in
metacognitive ability. Metacognitive ability is a particularly strin-
gent test of consciousness, since it explicitly focuses on conscious
report, thus avoiding the association in someother studies between
neural signatures and responses which may be correct either by
chance or due to unconscious knowledge (Lau and Rosenthal,
2011). Fleming and colleagues presented volunteers with two sets
of six Gabor patches, with one set of six including a single Gabor
patch with a marginally higher contrast. Participants made a judg-
ment as to which set included the deviant patch and then made
a conﬁdence report on their previous decision. Using a staircase
function, objective performance was ﬁxed at 71%, but volunteers’
ability to match conﬁdence levels with performance (metacogni-
tive ability) differedmarkedly. Individual differences in volunteers’
metacognitive ability correlated both with prefrontal gray matter
volume and white matter integrity (Fleming et al., 2010).
The association between PPN and conscious content could be
further tested by reducing conscious level, thus also diminishing
the capacity for conscious processing, and observing whether PPN
activity falls in parallel. Complementing the data from coma and
vegetative state patients mentioned above, Davis et al. (2007) have
shown that parts of the PPN appear necessary for normal levels
of consciousness. In this study the general anesthetic, propofol,
was administered to normal participants at various intensities,
while they were presented with auditory stimuli at multiple lev-
els of complexity. Lateral prefrontal activity reduced in line with
a reduction in conscious level, and reﬂected an impairment in
sentence comprehension and subsequent recall.
In summary, PPN lesions impair normal conscious function, as
doesTMSwhen applied to these regions. Functional and structural
imaging studies have strongly implicated the PPN in perceptual
transitions, the conscious detection of stimuli in a range of modal-
ities, sustaining percepts, and in metacognitive decisions on those
percepts. Finally,a reductionof conscious levelwhenunder general
anesthesia is associated with a reduced lateral prefrontal activity.
THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
NEURAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PREFRONTAL
PARIETAL NETWORK
A growing set of consciousness theories have attempted to link
experimental ﬁndings in consciousness science to cognitive and
neurophysiological architectures (see Seth, 2007;Kouider, 2009 for
reviews): prominent examples of theories articulated at the neural
level include (neuronal) global workspace theory (Baars, 1988,
2005;Dehaene andNaccache, 2001; Baars et al., 2003;Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011), reentry theory (Lamme, 2006, 2010), dynamic
core, integrated information theories (Tononi and Edelman, 1998;
Edelman, 2003; Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Tononi, 2008), and
causal density theory (Seth et al., 2011).
Neuronal global workspace theory is the most explicit in
terms of PPN activity (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). According to this theory, conscious con-
tent, which is determined by domain-speciﬁc local processing,
gains access to consciousness via integration into a “global work-
space.”This integration is mediated via long-range corticocortical
“workspace” neuronal projections that are particularly dense in
prefrontal, parietal, and cingulate regions. A speciﬁc conscious
content is suggested to be encoded by the sustained activity of
a fraction of these workspace neurons, the rest being inhibited
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Other key elements of the the-
ory propose that conscious contents are determined in an “all or
none” fashion via “ignition” of the global workspace, where igni-
tion is reﬂected in late cortical potentials distributed across PFC
and other high-level associative cortices, and in high frequency
(e.g., gamma-band) increases in power and synchrony. Interest-
ingly,while this theory is explicit about neurobiological substrates,
it leaves behind a substantial portion of the psychological detail
that was part of the original “cognitive” global workspace the-
ory introduced by Baars (1988). We return to Baars’ work in the
following section.
Lamme’s “neural stance” on consciousness identiﬁes reentrant
or feedback connections as the key ingredient in generating con-
scious content (Lamme, 2006, 2010). Synthesizing work from a
largenumber of studies examiningneural responses tomasked and
unmasked stimuli, Lamme proposes that reentrant connections
encapsulating the PPN and lower-level modality speciﬁc cortices
are necessary for cognitively accessible, subjectively reportable
conscious contents. This claim is compatible with neuronal global
workspace theory; the theories further align in associating late
components of cortical evoked potentials with cognitive access.
The theories diverge, however, with Lamme’s claim that a non-
accessible form of conscious content (i.e., phenomenal conscious-
ness without access consciousness, in the terminology of Block,
2007), is generated by reentry locally within posterior cortical
regions. A major challenge attending this claim is of course how
to verify the existence of such conscious contents in the absence of
verbal or behavioral report; a lively debate continues around this
issue (Block, 2007; Kouider et al., 2010; Lamme, 2010; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011).
Zeki (2007) has proposed a related theory, micro-
consciousness, which is perhaps the most ambivalent of modern
theories toward the association between the PPN and conscious-
ness. While Zeki concedes that uniﬁed forms of consciousness
or those which involve access may require the PPN, he believes,
like Lamme, that there is a non-reportable, purely phenomenal
form of consciousness, which can be supported by local sen-
sory regions, for instance with visual cortex representing visual
consciousness. The theory of micro-consciousness diverges from
Lamme’s reentrant theory, however, in that for Zeki consciousness
is not dependent on feedback pathways, for instance fromV4 toV1
for color vision. Instead, it is suggested that the level of conscious-
ness for a given form of phenomenal content is dependent only
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on the strength of activity within the region that processes that
form of information; therefore, V4 alone is capable of generating
color vision, for instance. Indeed, patients with focal lesions in V1
still report signiﬁcant, though degraded, visual phenomenology,
despite non-functional back-projections (Ffytche and Zeki, 2011).
Although much evidence has already been cited in the section
“Evidence Linking the Prefrontal Parietal Network with Conscious
Content” to demonstrate the importance of the PPN for con-
sciousness, Fisch et al. (2009) have reported indirect evidence in
support of micro-consciousness. Using intracranial electrodes on
awide range of cortical surface locations in 11 patients, a backward
masking paradigm was employed, where pictures of various cate-
gories were brieﬂy presented, followed by a mask. Localized bursts
of gamma-band activity were found, primarily in visual regions,
and with an early time signature approximately 150–200ms fol-
lowing stimulus onset. The authors note, however, that this doesn’t
rule out a critical role of the PPN for conscious recognition in a
later time window (>300ms). Indeed, such activity was observed
in the same study.
The dynamic core, integrated information, and causal density
theories are also compatible with a key role of the PPN in con-
sciousness, though these theories are less anatomically speciﬁc
than those discussed above. The dynamic core theory (Tononi
and Edelman, 1998; Edelman, 2003) proposes that consciousness
depends on a ﬂexible and dynamically constituted functional clus-
ter of thalamocortical neurons, generating dynamics characterized
by conjoined functional integration and functional segregation.
According to the theory, these dynamics are mediated by highly
reentrant connections within the thalamocortical system. The
anatomical boundaries of the dynamic core are considered to be
highly labile, so that neuronal groups or even brain regions may
form part of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) at one
time, but not at another. Having said this, the dynamic core theory
may be considered an extension of Edelman’s theory of neuronal
group selection (TNGS) which proposes explicitly that conscious-
ness emerges from interactions between posterior regions involved
in perceptual categorization and frontoparietal regions implicated
in the formation and maintenance of value-category memories
(Edelman, 1989, 2003; Edelman et al., 2011). Taken together, these
theories imply a core role for the PPN in generating conscious
contents.
The information integration theory of consciousness (IITC;
Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Tononi, 2008; Barrett and Seth, 2011)
shares with the dynamic core theory an emphasis on quanti-
tative description of conjoined segregation and integration in
dynamics. The IITC operationalizes this notion in a subtly but
signiﬁcantly different way, as the extent to which a network gen-
erates “integrated information.” In this view, “information” refers
to how much the present state of a system reveals about its past
state (or states), in terms of reduction of uncertainty or entropy;
this aspect reﬂects the diversity and informativeness of conscious
scenes. “Integration” reﬂects the degree to which this informa-
tion is generated only by considering the system as a whole, over
and above that generated by its parts considered independently;
this aspect is argued to reﬂect the phenomenal unity of conscious
scenes. Quantitative measures of integrated information, denoted
by Φ, have been proposed both by Tononi (Balduzzi and Tononi,
2008; Tononi, 2008) and by Barrett and Seth (2011); see Seth et al.
(2011) for a summary.
Tononi emphasizes that the IITC accounts for some broad
anatomical facts about consciousness, including its association
with the thalamocortical system.However,besides noting that gen-
eral architectural features of thalamocortical and corticocortical
circuits (described further below) are compatible with generating
high values of integrated information, the theory does not propose
speciﬁc roles for the PPN with respect to these features (Tononi
and Koch, 2008). Indeed, for Tononi, the IITC is strictly agnostic
about implementation; consciousness could be attributed to any
system generating sufﬁciently high-levels of integrated informa-
tion. There are however weaker interpretations of the IITC which
view integrated information as an “explanatory correlate” map-
ping features of phenomenology onto features of neural dynamics
(Seth, 2009; Barrett and Seth, 2011); on this view, high integrated
information may be necessary but not sufﬁcient for conscious-
ness, and incorporation of the PPN may therefore also become a
necessary feature of the neural grounding of the theory.
A similar perspective applies to causal density theory, where
“causal density” provides a third means of quantifying conjoined
dynamical segregation and integration (Seth, 2005; Seth et al.,
2008, 2011). Causal density leverages time-series analysis meth-
ods (speciﬁcally Granger causality, which is a statistical measure
of causality based on relative predictability) to quantify the overall
level of causal interactivity within a system. High values of causal
density are obtained when system elements combine statistical
independence (so that they provide potentially useful predictive
information) with statistical dependence (so that this predictive
information is in fact useful). Causal density is offered explicitly
as an “explanatory correlate” (Seth, 2009) and as a necessary but
not sufﬁcient criterion for consciousness. As with Φ, causal den-
sity may be compatible with general anatomical properties of the
PPN and associated brain networks.
An important challenge for futurework is to compare theneural
theories described above in the context of structural properties of
brain networks.While all theories are broadly compatible with the
high-levels of interconnectedness observed in both corticocortical
and thalamocortical networks (though only trivially so for Zeki’s
theory), rapidly developing research on speciﬁc topological prop-
erties of these networks may allow greater discriminatory power
and shed new light on the potential importance of the PPN for
consciousness. For example, suggestive new ﬁndings, based on
combining multiple anatomical tracing studies, identify a tightly
integrated “core circuit” in the macaque brain including the PPN,
with the PFC containing a very large proportion of topologically
central subregions (Modha and Singh, 2010).
COGNITIVE THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PREFRONTAL
PARIETAL NETWORK
As neural theories of consciousness make progress in connecting
neural to phenomenal properties, they often seem do so at the
expense of psychological or cognitive detail. However, cognitive
theories of consciousness have a long history, extending back to
when “consciousness” as an explanandum was not often referred
to explicitly (see de Gardelle and Kouider, 2009 for a review).
Thus, in early work and anticipating later workspace theories,
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Broadbent (1958) associated consciousness with a “limited capac-
ity channel” involved in serial processing; this theory entailed a
very close association between consciousness and attention. Some
years later, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) associated conscious con-
tents with working memory, moving yet closer toward central
tenets of global workspace theory. Later cognitive theories made
explicit reference to elements of the PPN. For example, Shallice
identiﬁed consciousness indirectly with a “supervisory attentional
system” situated in PFC, controlling the activity of “lower level”
sensorimotor modules (Norman and Shallice, 1986). This the-
ory operationalized consciousness as a form of executive control,
without much reference to phenomenal aspects.
Building onmuch of this earlywork, the predominant cognitive
theory of consciousness remains Bernard Baars’ global workspace
theory (Baars, 1988, 2005). The core elements of this theory are
(i) competition among local (unconscious) processes for access to
a “global workspace” the contents which are made globally avail-
able, (ii) “broadcast” of workspace contents to a broad repertoire
of receiving modules. With these core elements, global workspace
theory ﬂuently accounts for the apparent seriality and uniﬁed
nature of conscious scenes, as well as the parallel processing
capacity of unconscious processes. As emphasized by Dehaene
and Changeux (2011), the theory seems especially well suited to
account for conscious access and is not normally interpreted as a
theory of “phenomenal consciousness” of the form described by
Block and Lamme [i.e., consciousness without cognitive access;
(Block, 2007; Lamme, 2010)].
Efforts to ground global workspace theory in neurobiology (see
Neural Theories of Consciousness and the PPN) have focused on
these core elements (though “broadcast” remains poorly speciﬁed
in neural terms) and have arguably come at the cost of neglecting
some of the psychological detail embedded in its original cognitive
instantiation. For example, Baars (1988) originally emphasized
that the (conscious) contents of the global workspace could cor-
respond, at any given time, to the contents of working memory;
indeed the theory has recently been summarized as suggesting
a “ﬂeeting memory capacity that enables access between brain
functions that are otherwise separate” (Baars, 2005). Cognitive,
as opposed to neuronal global workspace theory also placed con-
siderable emphasis on unconscious “contextual” systems which
shape the conscious contents articulated within the workspace
itself (Baars, 2005).
The “higher-order” thought (HOT) theory set forth most
prominently by Rosenthal also deserves mention. On this theory,
a mental state is conscious when a person is aware (or disposed
toward being aware) of being in that state (Rosenthal, 2005). The-
ories differ according to whether awareness of the mental state
is achieved by perceiving it (Lycan, 2004) or thinking about it
(Rosenthal, 2005). Importantly, the theory is not circular; the
higher-order thoughts/perceptions themselves are not consciously
reportable unless accompanied by a corresponding third-order
thought or perception. Although originally a philosophical theory,
HOT theories have recently attracted attention within cognitive
neuroscience. Lau has suggested that HOTs could be implemented
as a process of internalized signal detection, in which perceptual
signals are assessed for their reliability according to the precepts
of signal detection theory. The neural mechanisms underlying this
process are suggested to lie within DLPFC (Rounis et al., 2010; Lau
and Rosenthal, 2011).
THE OVERLAP BETWEEN ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Before the connection between consciousness and the PPN was
a focus of investigation, this network of brain regions was for
many years associatedwith other cognitive processes,most notably
working memory, executive functions, and attention (Cabeza and
Nyberg, 2000). This overlap strongly suggests that these other cog-
nitive processes are closely related to consciousness. In this section,
we ﬁrst examine the strength of the argument for treating atten-
tion and consciousness as independent processes, before outlining
the common links between these two processes, as well as with
related high-level cognitive functions.
THE ARGUMENT FOR A DISSOCIATION BETWEEN ATTENTION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
Even up to the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, many researchers
took the view that attention and consciousness were putatively
one and the same process, or that attention provided a “gateway”
to consciousness (Broadbent, 1958; Posner, 1994; Rees and Lavie,
2001). For instance, Rees and Lavie (2001) noted the marked sim-
ilarity in activation patterns between attention and consciousness
studies and suggested that there is “a close functional relationship
between attention and awareness.” Over recent years, however,
there has been a growing body of opinion that these two phenom-
ena are highly or even entirely dissociable (Koch and Tsuchiya,
2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010a,b). For instance Koch and colleagues
claim that attention and consciousness can be “manipulated inde-
pendently” and that attention is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient
for consciousness (van Boxtel et al., 2010b).
The crux of this lively debate undoubtedly rests on questions of
the deﬁnition and scope of attention and consciousness. In their
latest review, van Boxtel et al. (2010b) limit attention to top-down
voluntary attention, and deﬁne this as the main process by which
an over-abundant data input is ﬁltered into a much reduced set of
salient items. They summarize attention as an “analyzer” of cog-
nition, and consciousness as a “synthesizer.” They operationally
deﬁne consciousness as stimulus visibility.
In line with their position, there is good evidence that atten-
tional processes, as deﬁned above, can operate without the
attended stimuli reaching consciousness (Bressan and Pizzighello,
2008; Kentridge et al., 2008; Bussche et al., 2010; Tapia et al., 2010).
For example, Kentridge et al. (2008) demonstrated that attention
can enhance the processing of unconscious targets: incongruent
or congruent colored disk primes, made invisible by metacontrast
masking, were followed by a subsequent visible colored annulus.
When attention was directed toward the location of the invisible
primed disks, the priming effect was enhanced.
Showing the opposite effect, Bressan and Pizzighello (2008)
implemented a paradigm in which an invisible distracting moving
stimulus nevertheless impaired accuracy on a primary task at ﬁxa-
tion. The authors proposed that the distracting stimulus created a
state of alertness and consequently a partial attentional shift away
from the central task. In contrast, when the distracting stimulus
was consciously detectable, accuracy was unimpaired, presumably
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because full processing allowed the designation of the distract-
ing stimulus as irrelevant to the task, with minimal attentional
resources attached to it. However, since this study is putatively
governed by a bottom-up attentional process, it is not strictly rele-
vant to the arguments of van Boxtel et al. (2010b). Nevertheless, it
provides intriguing evidence that attention to unconscious stimuli
can both enhance and interfere with a central conscious task.
Although such examples do indicate that attention is not sufﬁ-
cient for consciousness, it does not follow that attention is dissoci-
ated from consciousness. Indeed, the studies described above can
be interpreted as showing that attention enhances existing con-
scious contents, or the probability that an item will gain access
to consciousness. In Bressan and Pizzighello (2008), reduced per-
formance on the primary task could be a consequence of reduced
awareness of the target when attention is partly allocated else-
where. Furthermore, in the study of Kentridge et al. (2008),
improved target detection could reﬂect enhanced awareness fol-
lowing attentional boosting of congruent primes. In line with this
position, attention has been shown to lower the threshold bywhich
a stimulus is consciously detected, or enhance apparent contrast
(Carrasco et al., 2000, 2004; see Figure 1 for illustration).
For evidence of a true (i.e., double) dissociation, what is
required is a demonstration that increased attention for a speciﬁc
visual feature leads to a reduction in the probability of con-
scious report of that feature. An apparently strong case for such
a double dissociation was recently made by Koch and colleagues
(van Boxtel et al., 2010a). A peripheral after-image inducer was
made either visible or invisible, by continuous ﬂash suppression.
Attention was either directed to the inducer, or distracted by a cen-
tral rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task. While increased
visibility of the inducer also led to increased after-image duration,
greater attention toward the inducer instead reduced after-image
duration.
Although this pattern of results suggests a double dissociation
between attention and consciousness, alternative interpretations
do exist. For instance, it is possible that increased attention in this
paradigm, rather than simply reducing the probability or dura-
tion of current conscious contents per se, instead provides a useful
role in suppressing an unhelpful and aberrant after-image, so that
other, more salient objects have a higher chance of gaining con-
scious access. Further experiments exploring double dissociations
between consciousness and attention are needed, preferably in
topics outside of visual illusory effects since such effects necessar-
ily reﬂect idiosyncrasies of the visual system and may not directly
reﬂect key mechanisms of consciousness itself.
Although the evidence that attention is not sufﬁcient for con-
sciousness is reasonablywell established, the case for consciousness
without attention is somewhat less clear. Evidence cited by van
Boxtel et al. (2010b) for consciousness without attention mainly
involves pop-out effects, gist effects, and detection of natural
objects, such as animals and faces. In each of these examples, how-
ever, it is important to establish whether attention has been fully
removed from the stimulus that the subject is conscious of, in terms
of absence of both top-down attention and bottom-up attention.
van Boxtel et al. (2010b) do not include or discuss bottom-up
attentional effects, since they claim that bottom-up attention is
necessarily engaged by visible moving stimuli, thus experimen-
tally precluding the opportunity to dissociate these two processes.
However, Bressan and Pizzighello (2008) ﬁndings suggest that
bottom-up attention can be engaged by invisible stimuli and so
there are not necessarily empirical barriers to including bottom-
up attention within a discussion of relations between attention
and consciousness. Furthermore, by limiting their focus to studies
manipulating only top-down effects, van Boxtel and colleagues
still need to entertain the possibility that, for any evidence demon-
strating consciousness without attention, bottom-up attentional
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of possible relationships between
attention and consciousness, with notable experimental examples. Note
that although the lower example is taken by some as evidence for the
independence of attention and consciousness, it is instead possible that in
this and all other cases there is a strong positive correlation between
attention and consciousness.
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processes may still be present and may be involved in selecting
items for conscious access.
Taking each of the putative examples of consciousness without
attention in turn: ﬁrst, pop-out effects of primitive visual targets,
for instance in a visual search task, have been assumed to occur
preattentively. However, if attention is sufﬁciently engaged away
from a simple target, such as a red element (with gray distracters)
or a speciﬁc orientation (with orthogonally angled distracters),
then there is a large detrimental effect on target detection (Joseph
et al., 1997; Theeuwes et al., 1999). Furthermore, attention has
been shown to modulate basic perceptual masking effects, such
as object substitution (Tata and Giaschi, 2004) and metacontrast
masking (Ramachandran and Cobb, 1995; Shelley-Tremblay and
Mack, 1999; Boyer and Ro, 2007).
Second, natural scene perception, also known as “gist,” is a
process where various semantic and phenomenological features
of a visual scene can be extracted, even with brief viewings of
150ms (Thorpe et al., 1996). It has been assumed that the speed of
this process precludes the possibility that selective attention plays
a role, since selective attention requires at least 200ms to become
established. However, one recent study has shown that if attention
is appropriately removed from a natural scene, then inattentional
blindness for that scene ensues (Cohen et al., 2011). Using a dual
task paradigm in a set of experiments, attention was withdrawn
from the natural scene by employingmulti-object tracking (MOT)
or a RSVP task. Using MOT, failure immediately to perceive a
visual scene occurred in 88% of participants, compared with only
4% when carrying out the single task of detecting and classifying
the visual scenes. Similar results occurred for the RSVP task (77%
of participants were unable immediately to perceive the scene,
compared with 7% for the detection and classiﬁcation task alone).
For both tasks, however, more participants were able to classify
the scene on question probes following the trial. In follow-up
experiments that modulated the difﬁculty of the MOT and RSVP
tasks, those tasks that were more difﬁcult and thus requiring more
attentional resources further impaired conscious detection of the
visual scene. This study clearly shows that a conscious sense of
gist is dependent on having at least a minimal level of attentional
processing available.
Third, and ﬁnally, the conscious detection of animals and faces
is thought to have a privileged access due to its biological salience
and can occur with very brief presentations, of the order of 20ms.
There is some evidence that detection rates are unimpaired during
a dual task, where attention is directed away from the naturalistic
objects (Li et al., 2002). However, these studies tend to present
single stimuli in isolation. Attention might, to some degree, be
automatically drawn to a single visually presented object, regard-
less of the inclusion of a distracting secondary task, especially
if that object carries innate biological salience (such as a face),
which would activate bottom-up attentional processes. Walker
et al. (2008) sought to investigate the importance of this factor,
by presenting animal images along with three other objects in
a complex naturalistic scene. Using this approach, the dual task
condition profoundly impaired detection of animal targets, even at
long onset durations of approximately 500ms. In addition,Walker
and colleagues found that even animal targets presented alonewere
detected less frequently under dual task than single task conditions,
though to a lesser extent than when presented with the three dis-
tractors. Therefore, even the conscious detection of naturalistic
objects is shown to be heavily modulated by attention, especially
if complex scenes are involved.
As well as behavioral dissociations, neural dissociations
between attention and consciousness have been proposed (Wyart
and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Tsubomi et al., 2011). For instance,
Wyart and Tallon-Baudry (2008) used MEG while subjects either
attended toward or away from a threshold stimulus, which was
reported consciously 50% of the time. Independent of attention,
consciously seen stimuli induced mid-gamma activity, whereas
attention induced high-gamma activity independent of conscious
report.However, since attentionwasmanipulated bydirecting par-
ticipants to a valid or invalid location, additional error monitoring
processes for the attentional contrast may account for the dissoci-
ation. In addition, both the attentional and consciousness effects
were largely conﬁned to early visual regions, thus inviting further
research to examine whether similar dissociations can be observed
in regions more commonly and centrally associated with either
attention or consciousness, such as the PPN.
A more recent study by Tsubomi et al. (2011) used fMRI to
investigate similar possible dissociations. Subjects were presented
with a visual backward masking ﬂanker paradigm, in which atten-
tion to ﬂankers enhanced target visibility and attention to themask
attenuated it. Attention to ﬂankers compared to mask, where visi-
bility was higher, was associated with increased occipito-temporal
sulcus activity. In addition, for both attentional conditions, visibil-
ity was correlatedwith activity in the same sulcus. In contrast, PPN
activity was observed for the two attentional conditions compared
with a no-attend control, independent of target visibility. How-
ever, the extent to which this study was investigating conscious
access may be limited, since almost all stimuli presented were suf-
ﬁciently clear and visible for object identity to correctly occur.
Indeed, if trials where subjects categorized the target as invisible
were removed from the analysis, essentially the same pattern of
results was found. Therefore, the observed occipito-temporal vis-
ibility effects may largely reﬂect the perceptual intensity of items
that have already gained access to conscious.
In summary, although studies do report pop-out effects, gist
processing and natural object detection occurring in the absence
of attention, further research has shown that attentional resources
are required in each case, in order to enable conscious report of
target stimuli. Indeed, the fact that attention is required for pop-
out effects of very simple visual stimuli, such as a colored element,
or an oriented gabor patch (Joseph et al., 1997; Theeuwes et al.,
1999) implies that for all conscious events, even those involv-
ing very primitive elements, at least some attentional resources
are necessary. In addition, although a small number of studies
have presented provisional evidence that neural dissociations can
be found between attention and consciousness, this is in con-
trast to considerable evidence (see sections Evidence Linking the
Prefrontal Parietal Network with Conscious Content above and
What is the Functional Role of the Prefrontal Parietal Network?
below) emphasizing a close neural overlap between these two
processes.
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SHOULD ATTENTION INCLUDEWORKINGMEMORYWITHIN ITS SCOPE?
As mentioned above, the question of overlap between attention
and consciousness critically depends on the corresponding deﬁn-
itions. If it is assumed, as argued above, that attention is necessary
for consciousness, and thus may play an important role in its func-
tion, one useful approach would be to expand on the deﬁnition of
attention.
One prominent model of attention is Bundesen’s neural the-
ory of visual attention (NTVA; Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al.,
2005). In the NTVA model, two waves of processing occur. During
the ﬁrst wave, processing resources are distributed unselectively
across the visual ﬁeld. The product of this wave of processing
is a saliency map, which stores the attentional weight for each
object in the visual ﬁeld, based on either matches with long-
term memory items or biologically salient representations. The
second wave of processing involves selective competition in the
form of a race to populate visual short-term memory until capac-
ity is reached (approximately four items), by the reallocation of
neuronal resources for each object, according to the attentional
weight assigned to it. Weighting for objects is governed by the
number of neurons recruited to represent it, while weighting for a
given object feature is controlled by the scaling of average neuronal
activity. Both top-down and bottom-up activations are involved
in assigning neuronal populations and activity.
Single neuron recording inmonkeys has provided good support
for the idea of a ﬁrst, unselected wave of activation. For instance,
Chelazzi et al. (1998) found using a visual search task, that in the
ﬁrst 150–200ms following stimulus onset, monkey inferotempo-
ral cortex neurons showed an equally raised response to any set of
stimuli.Only after this stage do the neuronsmodulate their activity
in line with the top-down goals of the task, so that neurons coding
for the target continue to increase in ﬁring rate, while those coding
for non-targets rapidly reduce in activity.
One critical feature of NTVA, therefore, is that in the ﬁrst
wave of activity there is a positive, though weak and unbiased
set of weightings for items in the visual scene, which could be
thought of as anunselective attentional enhancement for the visual
ﬁeld. Intriguingly, this attentional feature could be a cognitive
and neural implementation of “gist,” discussed in the previous
section, and may explain the extraction of some phenomenologi-
cal and semantic features from a brief natural scene presentation,
as well as the lack of detail of the percept. In addition, similar
positive, though unselective attentional weightings could in prin-
ciple explain other effects, such as iconic memory persistence and
partial reportability. Indirect evidence in support of this has been
reported in an fMRI study by Ruff et al. (2007),who presented vol-
unteers with both a partial report and iconic memory task. Very
similar attentional networks, especially comprising the PPN, were
observed for both tasks.
Suggestively, NTVA includes working memory capacity as one
important parameter, such that the outputs of attentional selec-
tion, via object classiﬁcation from long-term memory, are placed
in a limited capacity short-term memory store.
In another prominent recent attentional model, Knudsen
agrees with van Boxtel and colleagues that attention is responsible
for selecting from the animal’s rich sensory input a small subset
of goal-relevant information for further processing, at the expense
of other less useful information, which is largely unprocessed and
ignored. Knudsen diverges from van Boxtel and colleagues, how-
ever, in discussing the endpoint of attentional ﬁltering: in this
case, Knudsen agrees with Bundesen and colleagues that atten-
tion is fundamentally responsible for furnishing working memory
with its speciﬁc content (Knudsen, 2007). Knudsen’s framework
for attention involves four component processes: working mem-
ory, competitive selection, based on biased competition (Desi-
mone and Duncan, 1995), top-down sensitivity control, and auto-
matic bottom-up saliency ﬁltering (Knudsen, 2007). All of these
processes interact to make up what is commonly referred to as
attention.
Given that working memory is by deﬁnition a conscious
process, this framework suggests that attention, as a compound
set of highly interconnected functions, is very closely aligned with
consciousness. One interpretation of this expanded view, follow-
ing arguments from a range of authors (Baars, 2005; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011) is that attention, whether top-down or bottom-
up, acts as the selecting mechanism for conscious contents, while
the working memory component acts as the speciﬁc store of (at
least some) conscious detail (see Figure 2). This perspective is
in accord with Dehaene and Changeux’s (2011) global neuronal
workspace theory, which sees attention as “serving as a ‘gateway’
that regulates which information reaches conscious processing”
and that “withdrawal of attentional selection is used to modulate
conscious access.” In addition, the concept of a “global workspace”
of conscious access bears many similarities to working memory
(Baars, 2005).
EVIDENCE FOR LINKS BETWEEN ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Considerable evidence exists from multiple domains supporting
a tight link between attention and consciousness. For instance, a
range of behavioral paradigms demonstrate that a reduction in
attentional focus towards a given stimulus also leads to a reduced
likelihood in consciously detecting the stimulus. Inattentional
blindness, coined by Mack and Rock (1998), refers to the fail-
ure to consciously detect an unexpected, but otherwise perfectly
visible stimulus,when attention is engaged elsewhere. In the classic
paradigm, observers have to decide which of the vertical or hor-
izontal line of a brieﬂy presented central cross is the longest. On
crucial trials, an additional shape appears near the cross, and after
the trial participants are asked whether they detected the shape.
Most fail to notice it. In a more dramatic version of this experi-
ment, approximately half of all participants fail to spot a person in
a gorilla suit who unexpectedly walks across the screen in a video,
when attention is devoted to a difﬁcult task of counting basket-
ball passes by players wearing white shirts while ignoring passes
by players wearing black shirts (Simons and Chabris, 1999). The
study by Cohen et al. (2011), described earlier, is another example
of such a paradigm.
A related paradigm, change blindness, involves an inability to
be conscious of a change in a visual scene, as long as attention is
not directed to the critical changing detail (Rensink et al., 1997).
For instance, if two otherwise identical images of an outdoor café
scene between twopeople are alternated every 640ms, separated by
ablank screen,participantswill fail to be conscious of a radical shift
in the position of a prominent background railing for on average
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FIGURE 2 | Adaptation of model of attention as formulated by Knudsen
(2007) to incorporate consciousness. Bottom-up attention initially
processes sensory input according to low level and biologically salient
ﬁlters. This data is then compared with long-term memory representations,
current goals, and other internal states, in order to assign weightings for an
attentional competitive selection process. The result of this process leads
to the strongest signals being favorably activated, with others inhibited.
Those items gaining sufﬁcient excitation will enter consciousness.
Conscious contents, which are maintained in working memory in the
model, can also be inﬂuenced by a recurrent loop with top-down attention
biasing weightings for competitive selection. According to this model, it is
possible for both top-down and bottom-up attention to occur for
unconscious items (for instance by modulating expectations without the
object of those expectations having sufﬁcient strength in the subsequent
competitive selection process to reach consciousness). However,
conscious access for a given object is only possible following an attentional
competitive selection process, which can be modulated by top-down and/or
bottom-up weightings.
10 s. Interestingly, participants more readily notice a change under
these conditions if it alters the functional relationship between
semantically central items in the visual scene, as compared to a
visually equivalent irrelevant change (Sampanes et al., 2008). Pre-
sumably, this form of change is more likely to attract attention,
which then ameliorates the change blindness effect.
Particularly relevant to exploring links between attention and
consciousness are neurological cases of hemispatial neglect, which
are most often considered as reﬂecting attentional deﬁcits (Mesu-
lam, 1981, 1999; Husain et al., 1997). Historically, neglect has been
most closely linked with damage to right posterior parietal cortex,
however more recent evidence suggests a substantial proportion
of neglect patients instead have right lateral prefrontal damage
(Husain and Kennard, 1996; Husain and Rorden, 2003). Neglect
is a condition signiﬁed by a marked reduction in awareness of
one side of space, usually on the left (although the syndrome is
equally commonly described as an impairment in being able to
attend to one side of space). Unlike blindsight, which is limited
to vision, neglect symptoms appear to impact all senses, including
touch (Sarri et al., 2006), although perceptual tests conﬁrm that
the condition is not one of sensory impairment per se. Functional
imaging studies in neglect patients have further demonstrated the
link between consciousness and the PPN. For example, in one
study, a neglect patient failed to notice a left ﬁnger touch on
half the trials because of concurrent visual stimulation on the
right. Activation was observed in the intact portions of the PPN
only when the patient was aware of the touch (Sarri et al., 2006).
Complementing the patient data, one intriguing study in normal
participants simulated the symptoms of neglect: conscious detec-
tion rates for left sided targets were signiﬁcantly reduced following
TMS applied to right posterior parietal cortex (Muggleton et al.,
2006).
These observations indicate that neglect as a syndrome is asso-
ciated with the lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal regions,
and by exhibiting symptoms which could easily be formulated
either as attentional or as consciousness deﬁcits, neglect reinforces
the view that these two processes are closely connected.
WHAT IS THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF THE PREFRONTAL
PARIETAL NETWORK?
Prefrontal parietal network activity is consistently reported in both
attention and consciousness studies (Rees, 2007). However, as
mentioned above, current views of attention describe it as a multi-
faceted process, closely connected to working memory, as well as
executive control, which are all collectively deployed in order to
carry out potentially complex goals.
Investigation into the functional role of the PPN has a long his-
tory, andhas centered onworkingmemory and executive processes
(Wager and Smith, 2003). PFC lesions in particular have for many
decades been associated with working memory and organizational
deﬁcits. For instance, Bor et al. (2006) used the spatial span task to
demonstrate that the extent of frontal lobe damage was related to
the size of working memory deﬁcit, with those patients who had
damage to the right DLPFC particularly impaired.
Prefrontal parietal network activity, however, can be found for
almost any demanding or novel task (Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Duncan, 2006) raising the possibility that high-level cognitive
functions and consciousness may be intrinsically associated. In
accord with this suggestion, studies have shown that conscious
engagement is required for the use of most logical operations,
assimilating information based on cause and effect, the encod-
ing of almost all forms of stimulus sequences, counting and
other non-trivial mathematic tasks, as well as for the acquisition
and deployment of most social and cultural forms of knowledge
(Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010). An intriguing corollary of the
link between consciousness and novel or complex task processing
is the robust ﬁnding that practice and automaticity reduces cogni-
tive demand, prefrontal parietal activity, and awareness of details
of a task (Jenkins et al., 1994; Landmann et al., 2007).
It should be noted, however, that rare instances of relatively
sophisticated unconscious processing have also been reported,
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for instance involving a speeded conscious recognition of a
semantically incongruent scene (Mudrik et al., 2011) or a
modulationof response tounconscious no-go signals in a gono-go
paradigm (van Gaal et al., 2008). Neither of these examples, how-
ever, involve the processing of a novel series of data, which even in
simple forms appears to require consciousness. Indeed, when tar-
get letters or monotonic sounds are rapidly presented in sequence,
conscious detection, and effective performance of any targets aside
from the initial onemay be delayed or even abolished. Intriguingly,
late prefrontal MEG signatures corresponding to target detection
are also delayed or abolished in line with performance impairment
(Marti et al., 2012).
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) have reported an additional uncon-
scious advantage effect, where the integration of a large set of data
is performed better when unconsciously processed, for instance in
a ranking task between four imaginary cars, each having 12 facts
revealed about them. However, more recent attempts to replicate
this ﬁnding have found either no effect, or a clear conscious advan-
tage effect instead, raising doubt on the consistency of this ﬁnding
(Newell et al., 2009; Aczel et al., 2011).
Examining how consciousness relates to other high-level cog-
nitive processes may provide an important avenue for exploring
the mechanism and details of conscious function. One approach
in this context is to ask which processes most robustly activate
the PPN. One recent fMRI study has suggested that PPN activ-
ity does not simply reﬂect task difﬁculty (Bor and Owen, 2007).
Bor and Owen (2007) compared PPN activity for a set of high-
level tasks: a standard random digit span working memory task,
two structured digit span tasks where participants could improve
performance using memory-based or novel mathematical chunk-
ing techniques, a long-term memory retrieval task and a mental
arithmetic task. Despite the fact that the structured versions of the
digit span tasks reduced task demands due to the strategic chunk-
ing of the stimuli, these conditions activated the PPN signiﬁcantly
more than all the other conditions, with the mathematical chunk-
ing condition activating PPN most robustly of all. In other words,
detecting and utilizing regular patterns activates the PPN more
robustly than working memory, long-term memory, or mental
arithmetic alone – even though these tasks were equally or more
difﬁcult, according to accuracy scores. Other studies have also
shown that the PPN is closely associated with similar recoding
processes, including when compared with more demanding ver-
sions of the same task (Prabhakaran et al., 2000; Bor et al., 2001,
2003, 2004; Moore et al., 2006; Bor and Owen, 2007; Murray and
Ranganath, 2007).
Therefore, within the general context of using consciousness
to carry out complex or novel goals, there may be a special role
for chunking processes, which search for, discover and exploit pat-
terns in order to optimize task performance. The special role that
chunking may play in consciousness links in closely with the crit-
ical need for conscious involvement in serial forms of data and
aligns with the serial nature of phenomenal experience (Seth et al.,
2005).
This perspective suggests a possible functional role for con-
sciousness: when a given automatic, unconscious routine is either
not optimal, or even detrimental (in the sense that it increases
the likelihood of the animal not meeting its biological needs,
or of putting it in danger), usually due to novel or complex
challenges, the relevant signals would be integrated into ongoing
conscious contents in order to facilitate discovery of an innov-
ative solution out of this impasse. Solutions, which may require
sophisticated forms of learning and ﬂexible behavior, are more
likely within consciousness because only here can disparate forms
of data be integrated in working memory, after attention has
prioritized the processing of this data. The detection and use
of “chunked” data patterns within a stimulus stream, or relat-
ing to motor output sequences, would be an especially powerful
means of discovering such innovative solutions, since chunking
can lower memory demands by data compression, and via regu-
larity detection can uncover profound,mechanistic features of the
environment. Chunking greatly facilitates automatization, which
in turn reduces the burden on conscious contents so that other
complex or novel tasks could gain conscious access and beneﬁt
from further optimization.
Although this process is likely to be metabolically expen-
sive, requiring activity within a large cortical network, this view
of consciousness is nevertheless evolutionarily valuable because
metabolic costs can in other ways be reduced, by more efﬁ-
ciently streamlining many tasks, and by discovering novel tech-
niques to intelligently avoid complex threats or obtain challenging
rewards.
CONCLUSION
There is compelling evidence that at least some of the“core”corre-
lates of consciousness reside in the PPN. Many current neurobio-
logical theories of consciousness reﬂect this view, either explicitly
or implicitly, in their models. Despite this, such theories tend not
to dwell on the psychological and cognitive processes that the PPN
may support; these include,prominently, attention,workingmem-
ory, and chunking. Indeed, the attentional functions supported by
the PPNhave been argued to be dissociable from the core processes
underlying consciousness.
Here, we have argued that these dissociations have been over-
stated. The relevant empirical evidence is open to alternative
explanations, and two critical issues complicate any interpreta-
tion in favor of a double dissociation: (i) the way that attention
is deﬁned theoretically (e.g., as bottom-up, top-down, or both)
and (ii) how attentional deployment can be adequately con-
trolled for empirically. An alternative view, following (Rees and
Lavie, 2001; Baars, 2005), among others, is that attention is inti-
mately linked with consciousness, and may be best understood
as involved in the selection of speciﬁc conscious contents. On
this view, some form of attention is necessary for consciousness,
although attention (without working memory) is not sufﬁcient
for consciousness.
Attention is best viewed as part of an integrated set of processes,
including working memory, whose purpose is to achieve complex
or novel goals.Activity within the PPN is associated bothwith con-
sciousness and with this ﬂexible set of processes, and is especially
prominent if the task involves the chunking or recoding of infor-
mation into regular patterns in order to optimize performance and
reduce demands. Chunking is one of the most profound learn-
ing mechanisms available for human cognition (Ericcson et al.,
1980; Gobet et al., 2001), and thus a powerful means by which
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integrated information is “reshaped” in the brain. Therefore, fur-
ther investigations about the role that chunking,aswell as attention
and working memory, plays in consciousness might prove highly
useful in understanding the psychological features of conscious-
ness and their relation to underlying neural mechanisms. More
generally, consciousness science is likely to beneﬁt from a broader
consideration of the functional role of the PPN including, and
indeed exploiting, its intimate links to attention,workingmemory,
and chunking.
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